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ABSTRACT
This study aimed to identify the trajectories for data collection automation in various Courts of Accounts (Tribunais de 
Contas), the standard features of the systems that have emerged, and the impacts on fiscal and accounting oversight in 
Brazil. Data collection automation is part of the digital transformation in the field of auditing; however, the literature on 
public sector auditing in Brazil, on digital transformation, or digital infrastructure, does not analyze how this transformation 
occurs and how the infrastructures are stabilized and shape the field of auditing. Data collection automation has unexpected 
implications for the content of public sector audits and the financial management of the public sector auditees. Identifying 
the trajectories for digital tools of data collection automation enables a discussion on whether currently adopted solutions 
vary and the effects on the standardization of government audits. The automation of data collection by the Court of Accounts, 
particularly its scope and frequency, affects how the audited public organizations prioritize the adoption and maintenance 
of accounting, budgeting, and financial planning policies and processes. The digital infrastructures that emerge from 
these digital tools shape the entire field of auditing, they become embedded, and they increase the cost of future changes, 
perpetuating the heterogeneity in the auditing and financial management of governments in the Brazilian federation. The 
article presents a longitudinal case study (1994 to 2020), with narratives built based on questionnaires and interviews with 
auditors from 26 Courts of Accounts. The automation of budgetary and accounting data collection by Courts of Accounts 
has changed the logic of the field of government auditing in Brazil. The digital infrastructures that emerge by connecting 
Courts and the audited public organizations under their jurisdictions have embedded concepts, definitions, and implicit 
expectations in a remote auditing logic. 
Keywords: Court of Auditors, public sector auditing, accounting, e-government.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Audit organizations have been increasingly relying 
on technology to carry out their processes. For example, 
auditors are already known to have adopted computer-
assisted audit tools and techniques in their data analyses 
(Bradford et al., 2020). Regarding the public sector, since 
the end of the 1980s, the International Organization of 
Supreme Audit Institutions (Intosai) has promoted the use 
of such tools in government audits to increase efficiency 
and automate repetitive, structured, and labor-intensive 
tasks (Huang & Vasarhelyi, 2019). 
Previous studies on audit automation usually focus on 
the data analysis stage and are spread over different areas 
of knowledge (Alles & Vasarhelyi, 2007). Recently, studies 
on digital transformation (Mergel et al., 2019) and digital 
infrastructure (Furneaux & Wade, 2011; Fürstenau et al., 
2019) have analyzed how this transformation occurs and 
stabilizes in various empirical contexts; however, they 
have not covered the field of auditing.
In Brazil, over the last three decades, the Courts of 
Accounts (Tribunais de Contas) have increasingly adopted 
electronic systems to automate the collection of data from 
public sector organizations to carry out various types 
of auditing. In general, data collection automation in 
Brazil preceded data analysis automation, which is still 
in an initial stage in many Courts. It is data collection 
automation that has given rise to the digital transformation 
currently underway. This automation is one example of 
digital transformation (Mergel et al., 2019), as it has had 
significant, continuous, and increasing effects due to the 
combination of computing, information, and connectivity 
technologies.
We define data collection automation as the 
introduction of electronic communication protocols 
during the auditee’s oversight process. These protocols 
form the interface between the issuer and receiver of the 
fiscal, budgetary, and accounting data. In general, the 
Courts use a digital tool (or just ‘systems’) through which 
the audited public organizations send their information 
to be analyzed by the auditors – called data collection 
system (DCS). According to the current legislation in the 
country, those systems are used by other organizations 
with a legal mandate to oversee government accounts, 
such as fiscal authorities. In Brazil, besides the Courts 
of Accounts, the federal government also uses similar 
systems to receive information on budget execution and 
public policies of local governments, such as the Health 
Ministry [Public Sector Health Budgets Information 
System (Siops)], the Education Ministry [Public Sector 
Education Budgets Information System (Siope)], and 
the National Treasury Secretariat [System of Fiscal and 
Information of the Brazilian Public Sector (Siconfi)]. One 
international example of electronic data collection from 
governments is the Budgeting, Accounting, and Reporting 
System of the state of Washington in the United States of 
America (State Auditor’s Office [SAO], 2021, March 9th).
By automating and making data collection remote 
through DCSs, the Courts of Accounts obtain benefits by 
overcoming constraints on time and resources needed for 
collecting, storing, and using increasingly comprehensive 
and more frequent information. For instance, digital 
storage replaces the custody of paper documents. 
Moreover, the transfer of paper documents no longer 
depends on physical means; instead, it relies on data 
transmission protocols (Reis et al., 2015).
However, how this transformation occurs, the 
innovation trajectories, and the implications have yet 
to be examined and are critical for better coordinating 
the digitalization of public sector audits in the country. 
Therefore, this study examines the emergence and 
proliferation of DCSs in the Courts and how these become 
digital infrastructures for organizing the auditing tasks. 
We adopt two concepts to understand such phenomena. 
First, the digital infrastructure is a set of individual but 
interconnected digital tools or computational systems 
that jointly evolve (Fürstenau et al., 2019). Second, path 
dependence is a possible explanation for the embeddedness 
of these infrastructures in each Court and the field of 
auditing.
The article analyzes the trajectories towards automation 
of data collection by the Courts of Accounts in Brazil, 
responsible for oversight of municipal governments. The 
article also describes the standard features and principles 
of the various DCSs that have emerged from the Courts’ 
initiatives to improve the audit process. Finally, it discusses 
some of the implications of this scenario.
We conducted a longitudinal case study of the data 
collection automation engendered by 26 Courts of 
Accounts, covering 1994 to 2020. The research counts 
on interviews with directors and senior civil servants who 
work with information and communications technology 
(ICT) in these Courts, triangulated with public documents 
and a questionnaire sent by the authors.
The results indicate that data collection automation 
evolved through a series of investments (in software, 
human resources, and handbooks) that the Courts made 
to develop their DCSs. Based on these DCSs, digital 
infrastructures have emerged and are pushing a broad 
digitalization of the public sector auditing process. These 
digital infrastructures include financial management 
systems in the municipalities, which send and provide data 
for remote auditing by the auditors of the Courts. Each 
infrastructure developed around the various Courts’ DCSs. 
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Those infrastructures have received investment from the 
Courts themselves and financial management software 
developers, and auditees. Those auditees (e.g., public 
sector organizations being audited) usually cover the 
costs of continually adapting the software and processes.
We identified eight different automation trajectories 
which the Courts followed in adopting and developing 
their DCSs. Those trajectories led to the convergence of 
core concepts and a specific logic for collecting data from 
audited organizations as an essential part of the public 
sector auditing model currently used in the country. 
Despite this convergence, the article brings out the 
implications of this transformation. 
The article briefly presents the context of the 
government oversight process, precisely the process that 
has been automated and that has given rise to the digital 
transformation currently underway in the field. Next, 
the concept of path dependence is presented as a central 
mechanism for configuring the development trajectories of 
the DCSs and, consequently, in the digital infrastructures. 
After the methodology section, we dedicate two sections to 
explaining the configurations and trajectories of the DCSs 
currently used by Courts. Subsequently, we discuss the 
argument that the DCSs give rise to digital infrastructures 
that enhance the embeddedness of those systems. We 
end by presenting some implications and conclusions.
2. THE CONTEXT OF GOVERNMENT OVERSIGHT PROCESS BY THE COURTS OF 
ACCOUNTS
The various reporting requirements on Brazilian 
municipalities lead to a regime of accountability overload 
(Halachmi, 2014). Various public sector organizations 
have some degree of reporting activities to the Courts 
of Accounts. However, this overload primarily occurs 
in city halls because of the extent of their activities (as 
service delivery and many local public policies). Also, 
city halls are in charge of consolidating the data from 
their local executive agencies. As city halls provide public 
services, run public policies, raise taxes, and regulate 
land use and urban expansion, among other issues, they 
are accountable for sending increasing volumes of data 
(even more frequently), both to the Courts of Accounts, 
to ministries and the National Treasury Secretariat.
The milestone for this context of accountability overload 
was the introduction of the Fiscal Responsibility Law (FRL) 
(Complementary Law n. 101, of May 4th, 2000), which 
gave a more prominent role to the Courts of Accounts 
regarding the fiscal oversight of governments (Loureiro 
et al., 2009). Until then, the Courts primarily enforced 
the legal compliance of administrative procedures taken 
by local and state governments regarding civil servants’ 
hiring, budget execution, and public procurement. 
They also oversaw the government’s annual accounts. 
The new FRL requirements pushed the auditing in the 
Brazilian public audit setting. A relevant movement 
was the ‘Program for the Modernization of the External 
Control System’ (Promoex in the Portuguese acronym), 
launched in 2005, counting on the support of the Inter-
American Development Bank. The program aimed to 
develop networks among the Courts, improve the use of 
information systems, and redesign oversight processes to 
comply with FRL requirements. Several Courts joined 
this program (Silva & Mário, 2018). 
However, the Courts have historically assumed a 
conservative and entrenched posture, almost exclusively 
focusing on compliance/legal auditing (Azevedo & Lino, 
2018). They have drawn criticisms for their excessively 
political logic of action (Loureiro et al., 2009) and 
nepotism, clientelism, and corrupt practices (Lino & 
Aquino, 2020). Despite following the same organizational 
architecture and audit model, the various Courts of 
Accounts spread throughout the national territory have 
different understandings of the fiscal and budgetary 
regulations (Nunes et al., 2019; Teixeira, 2020) and levels 
of enforcement (Lino & Aquino, 2018).
The typical fiscal oversight process that the Courts 
of Accounts have institutionalized can be described in 
a simplified three-stage process. In the first stage, public 
organizations, such as municipal governments, compulsorily 
send data to the Court with the frequency and scope defined 
by the Court. In the second stage, the data stored are used 
by auditors running remote audits. In the third stage, the 
Court’s Magistrates board judge the compliance of auditees 
to the regulation (or performance, in some specific oversight 
processes), based on the reports prepared by auditors, and 
issue an audit opinion and recommendations to the auditee 
with corrective measures or sanctions (the “court’s report”).
Data collection automation occurred precisely in 
the first stage of the process mentioned, substituting 
the previous paper reporting (analogical format) of 
financial reports and the procurement documents (Reis 
et al., 2015). Initially, municipal civil servants delivered 
in person all the data for the oversight process at the 
Court’s headquarters (or regional office). Previously they 
delivered paper documents in an analogical ritual and then 
started to use floppy disks to store and transport digital 
documents and spreadsheets. Subsequently, with electronic 
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communication and data transfer protocols of DCSs, data 
collection and storage became digital and remote. Some 
Courts then converged to a data-driven audit model, in 
which the auditing tasks follow the collected data (Arnold, 
2018). For example, Courts started to run preliminarily 
processing of the data collected from city halls and send 
“non-compliance warnings” to the auditors in charge to 
audit each municipality (Lino & Aquino, 2018).
As will be presented, each Court adopted a DCS in its 
own time. They are currently using different DCS solutions 
and versions in the country. However, the many DCS in 
place has standard features. They are systems connected 
to the internet applying an electronic communication 
protocol and a previously defined architecture (data 
layout) to receive data packages sent by auditees. Auditees 
send data from their Integrated Financial Management 
Information System (IFMIS) (the acronym in Portuguese 
applied in the country is ‘Siafic’ according to Federal 
Decree n. 10,540, 2020, November 5th). Data collection 
is different from what is known as “data extraction.” 
On the one hand, DCS receives data from the auditee 
(e.g., municipality or state); on the other hand, for the 
data extraction, the auditors use tools to directly access 
auditees’ financial management system to run transactions 
tests (Teeter et al., 2010). In the Brazilian case, city halls 
upload the budgetary and accounting data package in the 
format and frequency required by the Court of Accounts 
using their IFMIS connected to the Court’s DCS. 
Each city hall has the autonomy to choose its IFMIS. 
The solution commonly adopted by municipalities in the 
country is to outsource the IFMIS using a commercial 
software licensing agreement, in which the supplier covers 
the costs for adapt the system according to the changes 
constantly imposed by the Court of Accounts (Aquino, 
Azevedo, Lino & Cardoso, 2021; Azevedo, Lino, Martins 
& Aquino, 2020).
Finally, a digital infrastructure emerges as the central 
module of the IFMIS in which the auditees connect to the 
DCS and provides data for the auditors’ data analysis tasks. 
This digital infrastructure will support and induce the 
data-driven audit in each Court, enabling the expansion 
of the remote auditing logic in the field. The choices made 
when developing the DCS are at the origin and the center 
of the digital infrastructure. 
3. PATH DEPENDENCE OF THE DIGITAL INFRASTRUCTURE
The development of a new DCS, replications of 
similar DCSs in various Courts via technical cooperation 
agreements, discontinuations, and changing DCS version 
are decisions at the “Court of Accounts” organizational 
level. However, they affect and are affected by the whole 
government oversight organizational field (composed 
of Courts, more than 5,500 municipalities, software 
suppliers, professional auditors’ associations, and other 
stakeholders). We argue that (i) there is a trajectory for 
the data collection automation in each Court and (ii) a 
trajectory for the field of auditing as a whole.
Data collection automation is an innovation applied by 
the Courts, initially adopted to improve the governmental 
fiscal monitoring reinvigorated by the FRL. Each Court 
has autonomously decided on adopting DCSs, and a 
digital infrastructure has gradually been consolidated 
and embedded. Such an infrastructure emerged due to 
interdependent systems evolving in relation to the other 
systems (Fürstenau et al., 2019). This infrastructure interacts, 
at one side, with the financial management systems in the 
governments (IFMIS), at the interface between the Court’s 
DCS with the auditees (municipalities) and, at the other side, 
with electronic auditing systems (computer-assisted audit 
techniques and tools [CAATTs]) used by the auditors from 
that Court. Those infrastructures leave a footprint of their 
trajectory, as Courts and auditee continuously use them, 
the individual DCS and IFMIS become part of the routines 
of those professionals and providers, they are accepted as 
an integral part of the organizational reality, they cease to 
be questioned (Fürstenau et al., 2019), and they become 
embedded. Various digital infrastructures emerge in the 
Brazilian government oversight field, are developed, and 
become embedded, depending on those Courts’ choices.
Courts that adopt innovation at an initial stage (early 
adopters) seek productivity gains in their activities (Fligstein, 
1985). At subsequent phases, other organizations adopt 
similar solutions later (late adopters), seeking legitimacy 
(Scott, 2014; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983) or in response to 
the uncertainties raised by solutions not tested yet. One 
example of these influences that emerge from the oversight 
organizational field is the already mentioned Promoex, 
which supported the Courts’ innovation in Brazil. Once a 
solution is adopted by the Court on its DCS, continuous 
investments raise barriers to changing a trajectory.
We adopt here the concept of path dependence, one 
explanation offered by the literature to the embeddedness 
of a digital infrastructure’s trajectory (Fürstenau et al., 
2019). Path dependence is the property of a stochastic 
process that emerges in the presence of contingency and 
self-reinforcement and creates the lock-in effect if there 
is/was no external shock (Vergne & Duran, 2010). More 
than the initial conditions affecting the adoption of a 
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solution, the trajectory is shaped by a series of events/
opportunities (contingencies) that drive the decisions 
(Vergne & Duran, 2010).
Once the technology has been chosen, considering the 
contingencies and reinforcing mechanisms for this path 
can intensify the permanency of the ongoing solution. 
Some examples are the positive network externalities, 
increasing returns to scale, scope, or learning (Vergne & 
Duran, 2010), or even losses (sunk costs) associated with 
the other possible alternatives (Kay, 2005).
As these path-dependent mechanisms take effect, 
organizations that remain on a particular trajectory of 
development will be locked in a position “that cannot be 
escaped endogenously” (Vergne & Duran, 2010, p. 743). 
An external shock, such as an institutional change [e.g., 
Schneiberg (2007)], could break the tendency to remain 
in the same direction. Moreover, the tendency to remain 
in the same direction will also disrupt if that direction is 
disturbed and the gains in scale and scope drop (Ruttan, 
2001) or when the features of the developed system become 
inadequate for the current demands due to regulatory or 
technological changes (Furneaux & Wade, 2011). 
On the other hand, in some situations, “a particular 
solution is developed so that it is hard, if not impossible, 
to reverse course or consider using alternative approaches 
even if they lead to better results” (Scott, 2014, p. 144).
Returning to the concept of embeddedness, the inertia 
of a digital infrastructure to change trajectory, even with a 
possible loss of functionality, is strengthened by the extent 
to which the system is an integral and unquestionable part 
of the organization’s routines (system embeddedness) 
(Furneaux & Wade, 2011; Fürstenau et al., 2019). Managers 
may not even associate the difficulty of changing a digital 
infrastructure with a loss of investments made or sunk 
costs or with system switching costs, as Furneaux and 
Wade (2011) show. Deep embeddedness means the tasks 
and processes heavily depend on the digital infrastructure 
interconnected with other organizational systems, and 
abandoning it becomes almost unimaginable (Furneaux 
& Wade, 2011).
4. METHODOLOGY
The analysis covered two aspects: (i) the automation 
trajectory for data collection by Courts of Accounts and (ii) 
the standard features and principles of the various systems 
that emerged in the period analyzed. Only DCSs focusing 
on budgetary and accounting data were analyzed, despite 
various Courts of Accounts have systems for collecting 
other types of data, such as public works, biddings, and 
civil servant hiring. The sample brings together a diverse 
set of DCSs currently in use (for accounting and budgetary 
data) and compares how these systems vary in relation 
to the attributes of a typical DCS being institutionalized 
in the oversight field. The convergence of features or 
attributes of this typical DCS would come from isolated 
initiatives and influences of other solutions in the field 
(Tolbert & Zucker, 1983), as the solutions sponsored by 
each Court sought to extend the automation perceived 
benefits if Courts accepted (or ignored) the collateral 
effects of automation on the auditing process.
We conducted a longitudinal case study (Elliott et 
al., 2008) observing the automation trajectories of the 
Courts of Accounts in the period from 1994 to 2020. 
“Automation trajectory” is the set of choices made by a 
Court of Accounts, from the design and implementation 
up to the continuous improvement of the versions of its 
DCS, within the period of analysis. The study focused 
on 26 Courts of Accounts with jurisdiction over multiple 
municipalities, based on the classification proposed by Lino 
and Aquino (2018). We mapped the DCSs initiatives and 
trajectories via interviews and documents for 26 Courts 
(Figure 1) and via a questionnaire for 18 of them (Table 1).
4.1 Data Collection
The study used documental sources and information 
collected in questionnaires and interviews. The interviews 
were carried out firstly in January/February 2016 and 
secondly in August/September 2018.
4.1.1 Data collection in 2016
First, we summarized the main attributes for the typical 
DCS, identified and collected from the Courts’ websites 
and from a pilot interview with a key informant from one 
Court of Accounts, to develop an electronic questionnaire 
(spreadsheet-format). Subsequently, the questionnaire was 
validated by the key informant and IFMIS consultants. 
Next, we sent the questionnaire to the ICT departments 
of all selected 26 Courts and received complete data from 
18 of them on whether those main attributes were present 
on each specific Court. Next, interviews were scheduled 
with directors and senior civil servants working with 
ICT in the 18 Courts. We sent formal requests for the 
ombudsman of those eight Courts that did not fill the 
questionnaire, to run interviews as an alternative. 
A combined approach based on semi-standardized 
open-ended questions and episodic interviews has been 
adopted to capture a narrative regarding the “adoption 
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and development” of the DCS of that Court. This type 
of interview associates the concrete event (technological 
change) with other concrete situations (moment, location, 
people involved, other contemporary events) experienced 
by the respondent and, finally, it is associated with the 
(decontextualized and abstract) knowledge the respondent 
has (about the DCS) (Flick, 1998; Hermanns, 1995). 
Based on the narratives, we proposed a concept map 
(Figure 1) for the trajectories identified using thematic 
coding (Flick, 1998), showing the sequence of versions 
adopted by each Court.
The interviews with the Courts started with validation 
of the characteristics of the current DCS captured by 
the questionnaire or on the Court’s website. Next, the 
interviewee described the event of DCS adoption. 
The protocol covered the events associated with the 
development of the DCS, the context at that time, possible 
technical cooperation agreements with other Courts of 
Accounts to grant use of the system, and pressures to adapt 
the DCS. It also questioned how the DCS was impacted by 
the national chart of accounts (Chart of Accounts Applied 
to the Public Sector - Pcasp) imposed by the reform of 
public accounting that was underway at the time.
In addition, we interviewed auditors from each one of 
the Courts, lasting an average of 20 minutes (maximum of 
1h18 and minimum of 10 minutes), as well as additional 
calls to clarify specific issues. The interviews in this phase 
were not recorded. However, during the telephone call, one 
of the authors made notes on an electronic spreadsheet 
listing the attributes of that DCS. Additional notes were 
taken during and at the end of the interview. Other 
triangulation interviews were carried out with IFMIS 
consultants on DCSs data uploading and one employee 
from Rui Barbosa Institute, the author of the study which 
reported the digital infrastructures in use by the Courts 
of Accounts in 2011.
4.1.2 Data collection in 2018
Later in 2018, the authors run the second round 
of interviews with the previously interviewed Courts, 
double-checking about changes of DCS versions and 
how each Court was addressing the National Treasury 
request to harmonize the DCS with the Treasury DCS 
(more granular and following a different frame). Courts 
of Accounts that had not previously participated were 
also interviewed. The interviews with directors and senior 
civil servants from 19 Courts of Accounts applied the 
same protocol lasting about 30 minutes (maximum of 
1h01 and minimum of 18 minutes). In this stage, all the 
interviews were recorded and transcribed.
We also categorized each Court according to favorable 
or unfavorable conditions for early or late adoption of 
its DCS (Table 1). A favorable context for automation 
enhances the benefits of early adoption of the DCS. We 
considered the following factors as the drivers for an 
early adoption: a lower auditor/auditees ratio, higher 
geographic dispersion of the auditees, difficult-to-access 
areas, auditees holding good ICT infrastructure, less 
internal resistance, or support by leaders. The conditions 
previously raised by Lino and Aquino (2018) and others 
were inductively outlined by the interviews.
4.2 Coding of the Automation Narrative
The narrative of the automation trajectory of the DCSs 
(Figure 1) was coded counting on the evidence collected 
by the episodic interviews. We identified that the trajectory 
occurs through changes of versions of DCS, understood 
here as system configurations, features and attributes 
(e.g., more or less granularity or integrity) through the 
application of technology (e.g., language, programming 
and database architecture, communication protocols). 
There is a certain level of dependence between technology 
employed and features, such as XBRL structure, which 
affects its integrity.
In an abductive approach (Reichertz, 2013), we used the 
previous literature on the use of ICT in the audit setting. 
Moreover, based on the interviews and questionnaires, 
we identified the attributes of a typical DCS: structure, 
integrity, mirroring, granularity, frequency, warnings, 
and analysis. The attributes correspond to the current 
version of the DCS in 2016 (Table 1) and the succession 
of the versions up to 2020 (Figure 1). However, they do 
not capture the different previous configurations.
5. ATTRIBUTES OF A TYPICAL DCS
The results indicate a convergence of the Courts of 
Accounts to a standard set of DCS’s attributes, probably 
favored by the interaction of the Courts during Promoex. 
Table 1 compares the attributes of 18 DCSs (structure; 
integrity; mirroring; granularity; frequency; and warnings 
and analysis).
5.1 Structure
The “structure” associates the data to categories/labels 
when the data are recorded, giving meaning to a data unit 
(e.g., own tax revenues). The less vulnerable the dataflow is 
(recording and storage of data in the IFMIS, extraction and 
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subsequent storage of the data by the DCS) and the clearer 
and more stable the labels used are, the less the auditing 
process will be susceptible to inappropriate manipulations 
or misinterpretations (Singleton, 2010). Inappropriate data 
manipulation is more likely when the structuring level is 
low, e.g., when the data is transmitted by sending text files or 
spreadsheets. Data are currently sent in the following ways, 
ordered from least to most structured: (i) the audited public 
sector organization, as a city hall, generates information 
in its IFMIS and enters it into a “client-based tool,” which 
may be the Court’s website or other electronic application; 
(ii) the data are generated and packaged by the IFMIS in a 
local file, in a pre-defined standard and format (txt, CSV, 
xls, XML, XBRL), and then the accountant in charge of 
the process command the IFMIS to transfer the data to the 
DCS; or (iii) the IFMIS automatically transfers the data to 
the DCS without any human interference.
5.2 Integrity
“Integrity” concerns to the absence of flaws in the 
data, such as out-of-range values and data (e.g., inverted 
values in accounts records). These flaws may occur when 
the data are not validated when transmitting them, 
impeding some analyses (Singleton, 2013). In most of 
the Courts, between transmission (or entry) of the data 
and its “acceptance” by the DCS, the system carries out 
validations to avoid receiving inconsistent data according 
to system rules (also known in the software language 
as business rules or logic). The DCS runs validations 
during the process of transmitting (at the auditees’ side) 
and receiving (at the Courts’ side) the data. After the 
validation, the data are stored and made available for the 
use of auditors from the Court. Integrity also includes 
checking the balances from different periods to control 
for unacceptable changes of previously transmitted data. 
For example, the “taxes” account balance at the end 
of one specific month should be equal to the opening 
balance in the following month. 
5.3 Mirroring
Mirroring means the extent to which the transmitted 
data fully reflects the data stored in the auditee’s IFMIS. 
Possible inappropriate manipulation of the data before 
transmission (of tax limits, for example) could be mitigated 
if the accountant transmits the data logged-in in the DCS, 
taking the responsibility for the data. The quality of the 
uploaded data could be improved if the incentives to send 
partial, provisional, or low-quality data (with flaws) were 
reduced. As some DCSs enables data to be retransmitted, 
mirroring is reduced, as the data can be altered after the 
Courts’ analyses. Some Courts prevent retransmission 
or adopt controlled retransmission. 
5.4 Granularity
The greater the level of detail in the data, the greater 
its volume and complexity (Danziger & Andersen, 2002) 
and the greater the need for automation. If the information 
requested by the Court is restricted to the “summarized 
account balances” of the balance sheet, such data could 
be easily filled into the DCS webpage (with the risk of 
errors and manipulations). In contrast, as the level of detail 
required goes to the transactional level (analytical level), 
manual data entry becomes unfeasible. Some Courts 
ask for budgetary execution at a transactional level or/
and supplementary information of chart of accounts (in 
Portuguese “registros de débito e crédito” and “contas 
correntes”).
5.5 Frequency
“Frequency” is the time interval between two reports 
transmitted to the DCS, comprising two similar datasets 
but retrieving transactions from different periods recorded 
in the IFMIS (e.g., April vs. June; 1st quarter vs. 2nd 
quarter; 2020 vs. 2021). Reporting monthly data (or even 
daily, as some Courts require for certain information) 
limits the auditee from making possible accounting 
adjustments in that month, as the data from previous 
months have already been reported, which would improve 
management (Power, 1997). Some collection systems 
capture data with more frequency or even continuously, 
enabling simultaneous auditing (Byrnes et al., 2015) and 
obliging the municipalities to keep their records up-to-
date. Alternatively, if the data are only collected annually, 
the accountants are free to adjust the city halls’ records 
for the whole year up to the reporting deadline.
5.6 Warnings and Analysis
The DCS uses automatic routines to issue non-
compliance warnings and preliminary reports on such 
occurrences to the auditors and audited public sector 
organizations. It is a type of simultaneous audit (Huang 
& Vasarhelyi, 2019). Among the various uses of the data 
collected are the provision of: (i) warnings to the auditees, 
when non-compliance to legal rule is identified, as 
exceeding fiscal ceilings imposed by FRL; (ii) brief reports 
for the auditees, presenting warnings on the budgetary, 
fiscal, or accounting performance; (iii) warnings and 
situational reports for auditors; and (iv) information for 
social control on the Court’s website.
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6. THE AUTOMATION TRAJECTORIES OF THE AUDIT OF GOVERNMENTS ANNUAL 
ACCOUNTS
Since the launch of the first DCS in 1994, automation 
in the Brazilian oversight field has four distinct stages 
that accompanied technological and regulatory waives 
in the financial management cycle (Figure 1). The main 
characteristics of the pre-FRL phase (1994-1999) are the 
search to control spending on personnel (Camata Law I 
and II – Complementary Law n. 82, of March 27th, 1995 
and Complementary Law n. 96, of May 31st, 1999) and low 
use of automation and digital tools. At the post-FRL phase 
(2000-2005) automated fiscal control increased, but ICT 
remained undervalued to receive financial and human 
dedicated resources. Next, the Promoex phase (2006-2012) 
was marked by technological breakthroughs, internet access 
cost reduction and new technologies, and collaboration 
between Courts (Silva & Mário, 2018). Finally, in the post-
Pcasp phase (from 2013 onwards), the Courts adhered to 
the new unified national chart of accounts and to the new 
automation features for issue digital financial statements 
directly from accounting records. The transformation is still 
underway, currently characterized by an expansion in the 
scope of the data collected by the Courts, covering issues 
such as public tenders, procurement or payroll, which go 
beyond the fiscal-budgetary data already broadly collected.
6.1 Initial Contexts
Despite the regulations for the public financial 
management cycle being the same for the various Courts 
of Accounts, some contexts may be more favorable for 
the adoption of DCSs. Some favorable contexts include 
resources available for investment, skillful teams, 
technological capabilities in the Courts (Fernandes et al., 
2018; Lino & Aquino, 2018) or in the audited organizations, 
and the geographic dispersion of municipalities where 
the Court operates.
At the time of initial adoption, a favorable context for 
automation would enhance the benefits of the Court being 
an early adopter (Janowski, 2015) and would encourage 
a search for productivity gains or legitimacy (Tolbert & 
Zucker, 1983). In favorable conditions, the early adopter 
would assume the cost of developing their own DCS 
solution or adopt solutions offered by other Courts, even 
if the solution’s effectiveness were uncertain. In contrast, in 
unfavorable contexts, the Court would wait for already tested 
solutions, delaying the automation process. We considered 
Courts as early adopters when they launched their DCS first 
version before Promoex in 2005 and late adopters from 2006. 
Most of the analyzed Courts launched their DCS (at least 
the first version) by 2005, being considered early adopters 
(Figure 1). Some started automation before or in the year the 
FRL came into effect (eight cases), given that Camata Laws I 
and II had already established the monitoring of personnel 
spending. In this first phase, the early adopters launched 
their self-developed solutions. Only the state of Roraima 
chose to adopt a pre-existing solution (that of the state of 
Santa Catarina). Immediately after that, in the second phase 
(post-FRL – 2000-2005), the FRL led to a rapid expansion 
of fiscal monitoring; five Courts developed their solutions, 
and four adopted the state of Santa Catarina’s system.
In general, the early adopters had a favorable context 
for adoption. Several factors explain this initial move: lower 
auditors/total auditees ratio, geographic dispersion of the 
public sector organizations audited, and difficult access. In 
the cases of the states of Espírito Santo and Rio de Janeiro, the 
lower number of auditees and high geographic concentration 
would mitigate the benefit of the innovation. Faced with less 
motivation at that time, Espírito Santo, Acre, Amazonas, 
and Rondônia invested just timidly on their early DCSs.
6.2 Path Contingencies
After the initial adoption, the Courts updated their 
DCSs’ versions, whether to add new technologies or adapt 
to the regulations. In general, versions were switched 
through incremental investments to the existing DCS or 
by substituting it for another new DCS developed by the 
Court or a version of a DCS granted for use in cooperation 
with another Court. 
Even with constant updates and changes, the evidence 
indicates that the trajectory of the DCSs was defined 
mainly by path-dependent mechanisms, such as sunk 
costs and switching costs, the search for legitimacy, and 
embeddedness (resistance among technical teams and 
audited public organizations) (Furneaux & Wade, 2011; 
Vergne & Duran, 2010).
The investments applied to switch versions included 
creating modules, expanding storage and data processing 
capacity, tools for auditors to use, auditor training, and the 
production of handbooks. Two important path-dependent 
mechanisms are present in the decision to switch versions: 
auditors and auditees spent resources and time migrating 
between versions (switching costs), and resources employed 
in previous versions were lost (sunk costs). Among the early 
adopters that persisted in their solution, some continuously 
improved the versions with new features (pattern 1, Table 1), 
constantly employing resources in ICT teams. Those early 
adopters managed to overcome the barrier of transition 
to the web environment. They increased the granularity 
of the data, automated audit warnings and the issuance of 
analyses, and improved the integrity of the data.
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Figure 1 Proliferation of financial data collection systems (DCSs) by the Courts of Accounts (1994-2020)
Notes: The figure presents when each DCS was adopted and its persistence, discontinuation, or change of versions for 26 Courts. 
There are 26 Courts represented; for those, there are collected evidence allowed to outline the emergence and substitution of 
versions of DCS. 
The following Portuguese-based acronyms for the several DCS mean: ACP = Public Accounts Auditing; ACPnet = Public Accounts 
Auditing System; APLIC = Computerized Public Accounts Audit; Audesp = Electronic Audit of Public Sector Organizations 
of the state of São Paulo; Audicontas = Accounts Auditing System; Cid.Web = Computerized system for data receipt of the 
Espírito Santo Court of Accounts; E-Contas = Information analysis system of the Pará Court of Accounts; E-Sfinge = Integrated 
Management Auditing System; Promoex = Program for Modernizing the External Control System of the States, Federal District, 
and Brazilian Municipalities; SAE = Electronic Auditing System; Sagres = System for Monitoring the Management of Society’s 
Resources; SIACE = Computerized System for supporting External Control; SIAI = Integrated Computerized Auditing System; SIAP 
= Public Administration Information System; SIAPC = Information System for Auditing and Accountability; SICAP = Integrated 
Public Sector Auditing System; Sicom = Computerized Municipal Accounts System; SIGA = Integrated Management and Auditing 
System; SIGAP = Integrated Management and Public Sector Auditing Systems; SIGFS = Integrated Tax Management System; 
SIGMA = Digital Computerized Analysis and Accountability System; SIM = Municipal Information System; SIM-AM = Municipal 
Information System – Monthly Monitoring; SISAP = Public Sector Auditing System; SisAud = Auditing System.
Brazilian states: AC = Acre; AL = Alagoas; AM = Amazonas; AP = Amapá; BA = Bahia; CE = Ceará; ES = Espírito Santo; GO = 
Goiás; MA = Maranhão; MG = Minas Gerais; MS = Mato Grosso do Sul; MT = Mato Grosso; PA = Pará; PB = Paraíba; PE = 
Pernambuco; PI = Piauí; PR = Paraná; RJ = Rio de Janeiro; RN = Rio Grande do Norte; RO = Rondônia; RR = Roraima; RS = Rio 
Grande do Sul; SC = Santa Catarina; SE = Sergipe; SP = São Paulo; TO = Tocantins.
Hexagons = the Court adopts a DCS through a cooperation agreement, versions in operation (solid line), or discontinued versions 
(dashed line). The lines that join the Courts represent a cooperation agreement (solid line) or an influence of the previous system on 
the current DCS (dashed line); squares = the Court develops a DCS (internally or contracting-it-out), versions in operation (solid line), 
or discontinued versions (dashed line) – the “T” lines above the squares and the hexagons indicate the DCS development period. 
1 = An auditor developed the SIAI system at the Pernambuco Court of Accounts, created the SIAI, but this system was never used 
by the Court. 2 = The Paraná Court of Accounts combined the use of two computerized systems from 2001: SIM-PCA and SIM-
LRF. 3 = Adoption of the SIGA-MT was optional for the municipalities at the time. 
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
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Other Courts (pattern 2) only carried out updates and 
small parametrizations to address changes in the fiscal 
regulation or make improvements without altering the 
structure or layout. From 2012 to 2014, they made new 
investments to update the version of their DCSs to a new 
national chart of accounts (Pcasp), increasing the path 
dependence. Thus, the path dependence of pattern 1 
is significantly greater than that of pattern 2 due to the 
sunk costs and the embeddedness with other systems, 
which are even more bound to their own technological 
solution trajectory. The use of versions conceded by 
another Court at some point in the trajectory characterizes 
other automation patterns (patterns 3, 4, 5, 7, and 8). Two 
groups of Courts converge around the models raised by 
systems “Sagres” and “Sicom” (from 2001/2002), which 
totally or partially influenced eight Courts between 2007 
and 2014 (Figure 1). Especially in pattern 1, there was 
much experimentation in the more peripheral components 
of the DCS, with the adoption of collection on new issues, 
discontinuation of others, and constant changes in the 
data validation rules.
After launching their own DCS, some early adopter 
Courts migrated to solutions granted in a cooperation 
agreement when it was clearer what would be ideal for a 
typical DCS for Courts of Accounts in Brazil (pattern 3, 
Table 1).
Other Courts did the inverse, starting with conceded 
codes [from the Public Accounts Auditing (ACP) of the 
state of Santa Catarina] they migrated straight away to 
their self-developed solution (pattern 4, Table 1). These 
Courts had an unfavorable context for early adoption and 
chose to start the process with less investment (without 
development costs).
The states of Acre and Espírito Santo (pattern 5, 
Table 1) started with their self-developed systems in the 
first years. They were under comparatively less pressure 
to adopt and underwent various changes until achieving 
greater automation.
The state of Piauí, in turn, adopted and improved 
the system Sagres from Paraíba (pattern 7, Table 1), 
internalizing greater automation in the short term, but 
anchored in the previous solution; initially, it did not 
implement solutions to guarantee data mirroring, such 
as using XML, which was only adopted in 2014.
Table 1



































































































1. Constant innovations in their self-developed system








0 Yes Yes Yes Yes/dc Bimonthly Yes Yes
GO Yes Yes 2001 - -2 Yes Yes Yes Yes/si Monthly Yes No
SP Yes Yes 2008 - -2 Yes Yes Yes Yes/si Monthly Yes Yes
PR Yes Yes 2004 - -2 Yes Yes Yes Yes/dc Monthly Yes Yes
2. Self-developed systems with little innovation







0 Yes Yes No Yes/si Bimonthly Yes Yes
CE Yes Yes 1998 - -1 Yes Yes No Yes/si Monthly Yes No
RS Yes Yes 1999 - -1 Yes Yes No No Bimonthly Yes Yes
RJ Yes No 2001 - 0 Yes No No No Monthly Yes No
3. Self-developed solution to later granted code







-2 Yes Yes Yes Yes/si Monthly Yes No
MG Yes Yes 2012 Sicom 0 Yes No Yes Yes/si Monthly Yes Yes
4. Granted code to later self-developed system





-2 Yes Yes Yes No Monthly Yes Yes
AM Yes No 2014 - -2 Yes Yes Yes Yes/si Monthly No No
MT Yes Yes 2006 - 0 Yes Yes Yes Yes/si Monthly Yes Yes
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-1 Yes Yes Yes Yes/si Monthly Yes No
ES Yes No 2013 Sicom -2 Yes Yes Yes Yes/dc Bimonthly Yes Yes
6. Later self-developed system




- Rising -2 Yes No Yes No Monthly Yes No
7. Improves granted code
PI No Yes 2009
I, Up, 
Imp
Sagres Rising -1 Yes Yes Yes Yes/si Monthly No No
8. Later granted code
MS No No 2010 I, Up Sicom Low -2 Yes Yes Yes Yes/si Monthly Yes No
Notes: The Table covers 18 Courts that answered the questionnaire and were interviewed regarding their choices related to 
investing in their own DCS, adopting one from another Court through a cooperation agreement, incrementally adapting their 
current one, or switching DCS and discontinuing the previous one. In the case of the state of Ceará, the description of the DCS 
was obtained in the Court of Accounts of the Municipalities of Ceará, incorporated by the State Court of Accounts in 2017. 
(1) Investments in information technology made by the Court (Imp = improvement of the DCS, with costly adoption of new 
features; Up = updating of the DCS and small parametrizations to address changes in the rules or make improvements, without 
altering the structure or layout of the DCS; I = implementation of the DCS; D = design, and development of the DCS); (2) Group 
with greater homogeneity in the DCS in operation in 2016; (3) Early adoption (in years) of the standardized national chart of 
accounts [Chart of Accounts Applied to the Public Sector (Pcasp)] in relation to the last adoption deadline set by the National 
Treasury Secretariat in 2015. 
si = supplementary information of chart of accounts is requested; dc = debit and credit records are requested; Sagres = System 
for Monitoring the Management of Society’s Resources; Sicom = Computerized Municipal Accounts System. 
Brazilian states: AC = Acre; AL = Alagoas; AM = Amazonas; AP = Amapá; BA = Bahia; CE = Ceará; ES = Espírito Santo; GO = 
Goiás; MA = Maranhão; MG = Minas Gerais; MS = Mato Grosso do Sul; MT = Mato Grosso; PA = Pará; PB = Paraíba; PE = 
Pernambuco; PI = Piauí; PR = Paraná; RJ = Rio de Janeiro; RN = Rio Grande do Norte; RO = Rondônia; RR = Roraima; RS = Rio 
Grande do Sul; SC = Santa Catarina; SE = Sergipe; SP = São Paulo; TO = Tocantins.
Source: Elaborated by the authors. 
Other Courts that were not in such as hurry to adopt 
early adopted the Sicom or Sagres system (pattern 8, 
Table 1) and advanced in automation with the same initial 
limitation of the state of Piauí, in terms of a low mirroring 
level. Finally, some Courts had difficulties launching their 
self-developed systems. The states of Bahia, Maranhão, 
and Pará (pattern 6, Table 1) developed their systems but 
with a low level of effective automation. These would, 
a priori, have a favorable context for innovation, but 
besides entering late, they faced difficulties in the fourth 
phase. Compared to the DCSs developed internally, those 
adopted through cooperation agreements had lower sunk 
costs and therefore faced less resistance from the teams of 
the Court. In any case, changing versions (own or granted) 
brings switching costs to the whole chain, affecting IFMIS 
providers and client municipalities (see below).
6.3 Exogenous Shocks
Disruptive technological or regulatory changes 
reduce the lock-in of a solution (Furneaux & Wade, 2011; 
Schneiberg, 2007; Vergne & Duran, 2010). Two shocks 
could be considered as exogenous and prompting or 
driving the practices of government reporting in Brazil, 
including the emergence and change of DCSs. First, the 
establishment of the FRL led to a transition from the 
analogical mode to the digital one for data collection, 
given the increased requirement for the Courts to monitor 
government fiscal performance. However, the sunk costs 
of development and training would continuously decrease 
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The second shock was the compulsory adoption of a 
new national chart of accounts (Pcasp) in 2013, which was 
not enough to reduce the lock-in of the older trajectories. 
The adoption of a nationally standardized chart of accounts 
is iconic for the oversight field. Depending on how the 
DCS’s proprietary source code was programmed, for 
instance, including the chart of accounts embedded in 
the code, it can be unfeasible to search for modifications 
among thousands or millions of lines of code. Suppose 
the electronic protocol to receive data (which reflects 
and is organized around a “chart of accounts”) is defined 
by the source code; any changes on the chart will reach 
the deepest layers of the system, with a greater chance of 
abandoning the previous solution. 
Most of the Courts anticipated the adoption of the 
standardized chart of accounts (Pcasp), launching the use 
of the new chart one or two years before the deadline set by 
the National Treasury (Table 1). For example, the Courts 
of the states of Goiás, São Paulo, and Paraná adopted the 
new chart two years in advance. These Courts (pattern 1) 
had already incurred higher sunk costs and again incurred 
the costs of adapting their DCSs to the new chart. On the 
other hand, the Courts with shared solutions with other 
Courts, which had already incurred sunk costs from their 
previous versions, migrated with few losses to solutions 
adapted to the new chart. This was the case of the state of 
Espírito Santo, which discontinued its version of Sicom in 
2010 (at the time not adapted to the new chart of accounts, 
as this DCS was only adapted to the new chart in 2014 
by the state of Goiás) to adopt CidadesWeb (a version 
inspired by São Paulo system Audesp). Currently, the 
DCSs already foresee periodic adaptations of the chart 
of accounts with low-cost operational updates.
Despite the technological and regulatory shocks 
reducing lock-in in the DCSs, the changes resulting from 
these shocks cause instability in the financial management 
infrastructure of governments and reduce the willingness 
of these governments to make new investments. As the 
dominant IFMIS model in the country is an outsourced one 
(Azevedo, Lino, Martins & Aquino, 2020), governments 
transfer the risk of obsolescence to private sector IFMIS 
providers and outsource their ICT and accounting teams. 
We also identified less frequent IFMIS arrangements in 
place, as the use of free software or modular systems 
developed by one Court itself and granted to the auditees 
to use for free. 
7. THE EMBEDMENT OF DIGITAL INFRASTRUCTURES
Path dependence is one of the probable reasons for 
the embeddedness of digital infrastructures (Fürstenau 
et al., 2019), establishing the main characteristics at the 
center of the infrastructure. Such characteristics, when 
changed, would cause high switching or sunk costs. As 
already presented, the trajectories of the DCSs are the 
center of the digital infrastructure for collecting fiscal 
data in Brazil. 
In the period analyzed, various interviews indicate 
that the DCS became a fundamental means through 
which data circulate for the oversight of public sector 
organizations, connecting the Courts’ auditors with the 
municipalities audited. As mentioned, the trajectories 
of the various DCSs in operation avoided switching 
or sunk costs, but they contain a degree of latent path 
dependence. In the absence of other external shocks 
(rather than the Pcasp compulsory adoption), the 
Courts avoided switching and sunk costs; they accepted 
a suboptimal level of functionality and condensed their 
innovations into incremental features over the current 
trajectory. Thus, over the long run, the transformation 
of the oversight and government auditing field as a 
whole ceased to be radical. This transformation in the 
oversight field derives from the DCS itself as the center 
of a digital infrastructure. 
The path-dependent mechanisms that influenced 
the DCS innovations decisions also involve switching 
costs and risks of sunk costs at both sides of the digital 
infrastructure. At one end, accountants operate the 
IFMISs of the municipalities reporting data, revising 
accounting and budgetary records policies to the 
changes in regulation and DCS, and at the other end, 
the computer-assisted audit tools, when used by auditors 
to run the collected data, shape routines, scope, and 
auditing plans. The influence of the DCS’s electronic 
protocols also affects the processes and modules of the 
other satellite systems of the IFMIS (called structuring 
systems by Decree n. 10,540 [2020, November 5th]), but 
in a non-uniform way, which can make the ongoing 
module integration a real challenge. 
The influence of the DCS’s electronic protocols also 
reaches handbooks and training on reporting tasks and, 
primarily, the routines of the civil servants and consultants 
carrying out this task in municipalities, as seen in the study 
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by Tilson et al. (2010). It implies that switching versions 
of the DCS affects the whole government auditing value 
chain because it affects the entire digital infrastructure. 
By changing a version of the DCS, the Court of Accounts 
imposes costs on the whole chain of stakeholders, audited 
organizations, and local government accounting and 
budgeting service providers. Depending on the changes 
imposed, the cost of implementation and disruptions in 
the process can lead to a systemic compliance loss to the 
oversight process by the auditees of that Court. 
This transformation has occurred silently and 
incrementally due to the system embeddedness (Furneaux 
& Wade, 2011; Fürstenau et al., 2019). Evidence of path 
dependence in this interconnection of systems in the 
infrastructure is how the Courts consider the risk of 
switching DCS versions and the impact on auditees. For 
example, Courts postponed adopting a new version of 
DCS when they detected that most municipalities would 
be late in reporting data, or there would be a reduction 
in the quality of reported data due to a lack of resources 
or limitations in the auditee’s IFMIS. The development 
of a DCS is intimately related to how the stakeholders 
connected to the digital infrastructure will respond to 
changes. The Court aims not to exceed the capacity of its 
auditees to adapt to the proposed changes, as reported 
in interviews: “we did not implement it before because the 
municipalities were unable to, and they would not have 
sent the data.” One solution frequently adopted by Courts 
that innovate in their DCSs is incremental change, in 
which new versions are launched recurrently. However, 
for the audited organizations, this model implies 
constant adaptations and an increase in adaptation 
costs along with accountability overload. An additional 
challenge for the Courts with multiple auditees is to 
deal with possible heterogeneity of the administrative 
and financial infrastructure of the public organizations 
it audits, which would enable the convergence of its 
digital infrastructure. A similar effect was identified 
by Bjorn et al. (2010).
The expansion of digital infrastructures is a living 
phenomenon, and it is still underway. It started with 
DCSs entering the oversight field and is now moving to 
increased use of computer-assisted audit tools. In this 
period, the continuous use of a digital infrastructure 
reinforced organizational processes and routines 
(system embeddedness), as discussed by Furneaux 
and Wade (2011). The development of various digital 
infrastructures also embeds concepts and definitions 
(e.g., “data transmission,” “non-compliance warnings”), 
expectations (e.g., the value chain adapts to its systems), 
and a logic of action (e.g., data are reported remotely, the 
auditor’s time is freed up for other tasks, and the audited 
organization incurs the reporting cost) (Aquino, Lino, 
Azevedo & Silva, 2021).
In the field of public sector auditing in Brazil, 
the presence of more than 30 digital infrastructures 
maintained by the Courts, connecting more than five 
thousand municipalities, creates a market for experts, 
the development of systems providers, and knowledge 
sharing. As they stabilize and converge in some aspects, 
the trajectories analyzed ultimately shape the general 
trajectory of transformation of the oversight field until 
external shocks alter the trajectory. This effect is reinforced 
by other initiatives, such as those of the Health Ministry, 
Education Ministry, and the National Treasury, which add 
additional complexity, meaning that the same municipality 
must comply with an agenda for reporting data to various 
DCSs. 
8. IMPLICATIONS FOR OVERSIGHT FIELD
The Courts of Accounts’ capacity to point out 
irregularities depends on their teams, resources, and 
political pressures and motivations (Lino & Aquino, 2018, 
2020). The results indicate that the data collection process 
can also positively affect the quality of the activities of 
the audit organizations. For example, interviewees raise 
productivity gains, such as a cost reduction in storing 
paper documents. The interviews also indicate that, along 
with the benefits of innovation in auditing processes, the 
proliferation of DCSs in the local government’s oversight 
develops a digital infrastructure that affects the entire 
chain of government auditing and financial management, 
implying some threats (Ghoneim et al., 2011).
First, the constant switching of versions of DCSs can 
weaken the financial management (software, processes, 
and staff training) of audited governments. As local 
government’s IFMISs are integrated into the Courts 
DCS, switching DCS causes sunk costs, both from the 
DCS and from the IFMIS, for the whole chain. Moreover, 
it adds switching costs, as it requires adaptations of the 
IFMIS versions and processes or turns such systems 
obsolete.
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The abrupt and constant switching of versions of DCSs 
brings uncertainty about how feasible it is to follow a 
brand-new launched version promptly or if it is better to 
wait for another one. It discourages auditees’ investments 
in system parametrization and integration and staff 
training. As the integration between the DCS and IFMIS 
is essential for the frequent exchange of granular data, 
the data collection process itself is negatively affected. 
Moreover, as IFMIS providers experience difficulties 
in passing on these costs within the client portfolio, 
they prioritize the parametrizations that the Courts of 
Accounts value the most, and with these providers define 
the operationalization of the reform agenda in the public 
sector, with little influence from the accounting standard-
setter (Azevedo, Aquino, Neves, & Silva, 2020). 
The continuous changes can also cause small 
commercial IFMIS providers to leave this market segment 
as they are unable to keep their solutions up to date in 
a competitive environment of widespread legal changes 
and innovations imposed by the DCSs. Moreover, 
some Courts of Accounts classify IFMIS packages as a 
commodity, do not allow governments to contract based 
on technical features, imposing low-cost bidding and 
enforcing price competition, which reduces investments in 
software development (Azevedo, Lino, Martins, & Aquino, 
2020). Financial management and accounting practices 
development for the entire federation may ultimately be 
made more complex and less homogenous than previously 
considered.
Second, the differences in attributes of the various 
DCSs in use can lead to greater diversity in those Courts’ 
activities. Compared with the analogical and physical 
reporting rituals previously in place, data collection 
automation opens up new possibilities regarding the 
granularity, frequency, and use of the collected data. 
However, potential differences in attributes of the DCS 
that have not converged yet tend to widen pre-existing 
differences (i) between the financial management processes 
and systems in Brazilian municipalities, (ii) in the activities 
of the Courts depending on the volume of data collected, 
and (iii) in the interpretations regarding the FRL carried 
by DCS’s logic and protocols. These differences are not 
always observed by auditors (Aquino, Lino, Azevedo & 
Silva, 2021).
Third, automation contributes to defining the audit 
and accounting processes in Courts and the audited public 
organizations. In the Courts, the DCS mirrors the Court’s 
decisions regarding prioritized content, defining the data 
stored and, therefore, the future consequences of remote 
auditing, as well as potential applications of artificial 
intelligence in those databases. Also, in the Courts, 
investment in DCSs focused just on financial-accounting 
issues can reduce operational or performance auditing 
efforts. In turn, in the public sector organizations audited, 
the DCS outlines the internal control accounting processes 
(e.g., recognition, measurement, and recording) as well 
as the adoption of IFMIS modules (Aquino, Azevedo, 
Lino, & Cardoso, 2021). 
The definition of the set of data to be collected also 
directly influences the “real” management in the audited 
organizations. These public sector organizations tend to 
prioritize maintaining and improving processes associated 
with the data collected by the Court of Auditor’s DCS, 
unlike the processes not yet covered by the DCS, which lose 
priority even if there is a legal requirement. One example 
of this is the prioritizing of fixed asset management, which 
produces data collected by the DCS, while tax subsidies 
are not monitored, not collected, and the organizations are 
not improving their management. Within a context such 
as this, processes are improved by the audited government 
looking just for compliance. 
Fourth, the context of accountability overload due 
to the increase in multiple data collections imposed on 
municipalities consumes growing resources to maintain 
a dedicated reporting team (Halachmi, 2014). The 
negative effect is intensified when multiple DSCs collect 
data of the same nature but with different accounting 
recommendations, conflicting standards, and encouraging 
different practices. One example is the alteration in 
budgetary classifiers of revenue, which, despite being 
requested by the National Treasury (Joint Ordinance n. 
1, 2017, September 15th), was not timely adapted by the 
Health Ministry’s DCS. Hence, auditees faced two different 
and conflicting requests that year.
Other effects that appear to be present in the field are 
the false expectations of the reach of remote auditing 
(Azevedo & Lino, 2018) and biases in remote auditing. 
Using automatic verification of non-compliance of data 
focused on budgetary, fiscal, and accounting aspects 
can create a false expectation of information quality and 
compliance (Azevedo & Lino, 2018). For example, not all 
aspects of the tax and other regulations are monitored 
by the Court. Particularly in a national analysis, the 
perception can be even more different from the reality, 
as each DCS has a different scope and uses different 
granularity in its collection. The auditing bias originating 
from the use of computer-assisted tools was recently 
discussed in more detail by Aquino, Lino, Azevedo, and 
Silva (2021). Briefly, the automation of auditing with a 
fiscal-budgetary focus will emphasize remotely verifying 
observable non-compliance in the data collected rather 
than non-compliance that is only observable in the 
physical or electronic processes that occur in the audited 
organization.
André Carlos Busanelli de Aquino, André Feliciano Lino & Ricardo Rocha de Azevedo
15R. Cont. Fin. – USP, São Paulo
9. CONCLUSIONS
In the last 26 years, the automation of data collection 
from auditees of the Courts of Accounts has developed 
with the Courts adopting DCSs. Over time, these DCSs 
have transformed into digital infrastructures, transporting 
data originating from the IFMIS of municipalities to 
the computer-assisted audit tools used by auditors. We 
observed eight different development trajectories of the 
DCSs, which in turn had some degree of influence on the 
digital infrastructures of these Courts, ranging from the 
collection to the use of the data by the auditors.
The trajectories mostly follow path-dependence 
mechanisms and the occurrence of lock-in. Despite that, 
we recognize that the actions of these mechanisms are 
not fully verifiable and distortable (Vergne & Duran, 
2010). Highlighting these methodological limitations, we 
suggest viewing the path-dependence here as a possible 
driving force in the trajectory in the oversight field and 
not a complete and definitive explanation for the process. 
There is an observed convergence of attributes around 
a typical DCS, but the differences between the DCSs in 
operation can intensify the differences between the Courts 
that have already been identified (Azevedo & Lino, 2018; 
Lino & Aquino, 2018; Nunes et al., 2019) and cause a 
heterogeneous inducement of reforms in the financial 
management cycle of governments (Bjorn et al., 2010).
The phenomenon analyzed is a living and dynamic 
process. The period from 1994 to 2020 shows only the 
start of the emergence of the digital infrastructures 
of the Courts and the convergence of the fiscal data 
collection tools and the remote auditing logic (Aquino, 
Lino, Azevedo, & Silva, 2021). The Courts continue to 
review their solutions under external pressures, such as 
the convergence to the National Treasury’s framework 
to report financial data (in Portuguese: ‘Matriz de Saldos 
Contábeis’) and frequent changes in the regulations.
Some solutions could be adopted to address the 
possible adverse effects foreseen in the previous section. 
Through a National Council of Courts of Accounts 
(similar to what already occurs in the Brazilian judiciary 
branch), an association (such as the Association of 
Members of the Courts of Accounts of Brazil [Atricon], 
or the Rui Barbosa Institute), the Courts could actively 
develop and coordinate an automation logic instead of 
merely reacting to technological and regulatory changes. 
Such active coordination would engage municipalities 
and providers to discuss a maturity framework for the 
fiscal data collection process and, therefore, to better 
support projects for integrating IFMISs, whether 
through free software or certification of commercial 
solutions.
Some reflections for future research can be listed. 
First, digital infrastructures, like any digital artifact 
in organizations, are not only technological material 
but also coordination tools. Despite the technological 
modernization underway, the Courts have not yet 
started to improve their governance and have drawn 
serious criticisms in this regard (Lino & Aquino, 2020). 
Some of the protocols embedded in DCSs may carry 
influences from the current politicization in the Courts 
and act as a source of systemic power. Second, despite 
the nationally standardized legislation, there is a lack 
of symmetry between the many Courts of Accounts in 
practice. Different prioritizations are observed in the 
set of data to be collected by municipalities and in their 
level of detail, which may also be more representative of 
political than merely technological effects. Third, these 
infrastructures contain a normative burden, and they 
shape what has the greatest and least value and how 
things should be done, continuously being crystallized 
by the digital infrastructure. From an institutional 
perspective, the introduction and proliferation of these 
infrastructures may reinforce the logic of remote auditing 
and can promote (without any awareness) the interests 
of powerful and influential players in the oversight field. 
These powerful players have access to resources to design 
the digital infrastructure according to specificities to 
fit their interests, shaping the behavior of auditors and 
accountants as other less powerful job positions, whether 
in the Courts or the audited organizations.
As highlighted, the automation trajectories of data 
collection by Courts of Accounts are a live phenomenon 
but consolidated. The features and attributes associated 
with the DCSs compose digital infrastructures and embed 
both auditor and accountant behaviors. Despite the 
benefits associated with automation, various unexpected 
effects of the proliferation of digital infrastructures have 
been pointed out. There is a need for greater reflection 
regarding the technology applied, both in terms of its 
antecedents (motivations) and its effects on financial and 
accounting management. 
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